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“People assume that abusing the Internet is an IT 
problem …  it isn’t an IT problem, it’s a 
management problem.” 
Retired NHS IT manager
Shouldn’t we be managing the risks more 
effectively in order to allow learners the freedom to 
use IT resources to better effect? 
Prince et al. (2010, p. 437)
2
Overview
• Introduction and background
• Web application blocking: earlier findings
• Research questions and issues
• Methodology and methods
• Web use at work – a risk?
• Approaches to managing information security
• Secure web gateways / web proxies
• False positives – the ROC curve
• Findings / Discussion
• Recommendations
• Questions
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Introduction and background
• LIS Manager in mental health NHS FT 2008-2012
• Variety of technological barriers / hindrances to 
information seeking, teaching and learning, clinical and 
management decision-making 
– ascribed variously to:
• Information governance/ information security
• IT infrastructure policies and practices
• Communications policy
• Blocking of ‘legitimate’ websites 
• Obstacles to use of particular content types and 
applications
• Social media / Web 2.0 a particular problem
• Implications?
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Impacts
Research questions / issues
• The nature and extent of restrictions on access to the World Wide 
Web within NHS organisations arising from organisational policies 
and practices
• Their impacts on professional information seeking and sharing, and 
working practices in general
• The attitudes, presuppositions and practices which bear on how web 
filtering is implemented within NHS trusts, in relation to overall 
organisational strategies
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• Web filtering devices and their limitations
Differing stakeholder perspectives involved
• Attitudes to / assumptions about (information governance, information 
security) risks
• NB distinction between websites and web applications
Part of a wider study of access to information for learning and teaching
Methodology and methods
Exploratory case study
• Unit(s) of analysis
• One or more NHS trusts of different types (DGH + community 
services, MH + community services, teaching hospital)
• Methods 
• Semi-structured interviews with key informants (10+ per trust) 
• selected via purposive / snowball sampling
• representing a variety of perspectives:
• Clinician education and staff development
• Library and information 
• Communications
• Information governance
• IT management, esp. network security and PC support
• Human resources 
• Workforce development 
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Methodology and methods
Exploratory case study
• Methods (cont’d)
• Interviews with other key informants:  NHS Evidence, medical 
school e-learning lead, secure web gateway vendor
• Gained additional perspectives
• Documentary analysis – selective / ad hoc
• Background
• Policies and strategies: IT, LIS, workforce development, information 
governance, Internet  AUPs
• Codes and standards
• Reports and reviews
• Statements of values
• Security device documentation
• Thematic analysis using NVivo
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Web use at work – a risk?
Categories of potential risk to the organisation:
• Legal – employers can be legally liable for staff accessing and 
distributing illegal material  
• Child pornography and other obscene material or racially inflammatory material, 
racial or sexual harassment, discrimination, hacking, the defamation of 
management, customers or competitors, software piracy, copyright infringement, 
fraud, and breaches of the Data Protection Act
• Security - ??? risks from websites and web applications
• Web-borne malware – major security threat – but ….
• NB not a close correlation between subject matter of web content 
type of content and malware risk - Provos et al. (2008)
• Productivity - ???
• Network bandwidth clogged / performance degraded
• Staff wasting time
• Positive effects?
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Approaches to managing 
information security (adapted from Fléchais et al., 2006)
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Category Description Example
T
e
c
h
n
ic
a
l
Prevent Stop attacks from occurring Firewalls, secure web gateways,
access control etc.
Detect Notice and identify attacks Monitoring of web use – not 
routinely permitted under UK law
React Stop or mitigate an attack Automated response systems 
linked to intrusion detection 
systems
Deter Discourage misuse Visibility of countermeasures
S
o
c
ia
l
Prevent Stop attacks from occurring AUPs; rules on locking screens, 
rules against p/w sharing, etc.
Detect Notice and identify attacks Sysadmins, alert users, auditing
React Stop or mitigate an attack Sysadmins or emergency 
response teams
Deter Discourage misuse Prosecution, disciplinary action
Secure web gateways / web proxies
• Sit at perimeter of organisation’s network – enforce 
acceptable use policies
• Commonly in use: Forcepoint (formerly Websense), Smoothwall, 
Bloxx, Trustwave WebMarshal, Webroot, etc.
• Two roles: 
• Authorisation and authentication / filters ‘inappropriate’ content 
• Blocks web-borne malware
• SWGs are able to categorise URLs and to analyse and manipulate 
scripts on web pages 
• Main mechanisms:
• Blacklists (may be third-party)
• ‘On the fly’ via machine learning / content categorisation
– ‘black box’ – commercially confidential
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False positives / the ROC curve
As sensitivity increases, specificity / accuracy declines
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Results
• Blocking of websites a problem frequently reported to NICE by 
librarians 
• District general hospital (DGH) and mental health services 
(MH) reported very few instances of website blocking
• When a legitimate website blocked, IT department had unblocked it 
promptly once reported 
• Pharmacists most affected; instances of website blocking at MH 
usually related to substance misuse, eating disorders or sexuality 
• Staff at teaching hospital (TH) experienced greatest number 
of obstacles to information-seeking caused by blocking of 
legitimate websites
• Reported frequencies of blocking varied from ‘every two months’ to 
‘constant’ or ‘daily, probably’
• Affected the work of clinical educators in particular
• Most blocked sites not reported to IT department
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Results
• Much decision-making in relation to information security issues was 
tacit – IT managers did not explicitly discuss risk
• IT security managers reported not having time to evaluate the 
effectiveness or impact of the SWGs they deployed
• Depended on reports from users (via calls logged with trust helpdesk) of 
false positives
• Likely to accept default configurations and categorisations of 
content offered by suppliers
• IT manager at TH appeared aware (via emails sent to him) of the 
inconvenience caused to users by false positives 
• Main focus of attention and concern at TH and MH: 
potential security risks or impact on network traffic 
presented by ‘recreational’/ non-work use of the web 
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Results
• TH had explicit policy of blocking advertising
• Claimed to mitigate potential security threat of ‘malvertising’ (web-
borne malware spread via syndicated advertising) 
• Sometimes seemed to have effect of blocking entire site content
• Likely factor in high number of blocked websites
• Possible factor: TH SWG’s lack of specificity in identifying 
and blocking inappropriate or compromised content
• Neither librarians nor IT managers aware of national 
whitelist of sites not to be blocked
• No relationship found between IG / IT structures and 
levels of blocking
• But communication between IT and IG in TH very poor
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Discussion
•“First, do no harm …”
Hippocratic oath
• IT staff should be at pains to avoid blocking the good 
when attempting to prevent the bad (Verma et al., 2012)
• “Users … don’t pursue innovative ideas because they 
can’t face any more ‘battles with security’ that they 
anticipate on the way to realising those ideas”
• Users’ experiencing false positives reduces the overall 
credibility of information security
• (Sasse, 2015)
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Recommendations
• National whitelist:
• Efforts needed to engage librarians with reporting / maintenance / updating
• Put in place robust local systems for IT departments to be notified of 
updates
• Responses to information security incidents should be proportionate 
• IT and IG departments should:
• encourage the reporting of false positives as applicable 
• institute processes for responding promptly to unblocking requests
• consult more widely with stakeholders in the development and revision of 
Internet AUPs
• publicise / consult on web filtering practices and monitor and evaluate their 
impacts – part of policy process
• establish enhanced levels of access to web content for clinical
and clinical support staff groups (e.g. librarians)
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Questions?
Catherine Ebenezer
lip12cme@sheffield.ac.uk
http://www.mendeley.com/profiles/catherine-ebenezer1/
@ebenezer1954
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